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Abstract

This paper investigates catering as a motivation for substitution between share
repurchases and dividend payments. I hypothesize that firms cater to investor demand
by repurchasing shares when investors place a premium on the stock price of firms
that repurchase shares, and by paying dividends when investors place a higher value
on dividend-paying firms. I propose a proxy to measure the relative preference for
repurchases over dividends—the difference premium. Results show that the decision
to repurchase shares or to pay dividends depends on this premium. Firms channel
higher fractions of the additional payout dollars toward share repurchases when this
premium is high. The market reaction to dividend changes is more favorable when
firms act in accordance with the catering hypothesis. Overall, I find that catering
plays a role in the substitution between repurchases and dividends.
JEL classification: G35
Keywords: Repurchases, Payout policy, Catering, Dividends
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1. Introduction
Miller and Modigliani (1961) demonstrated that in a world with perfectly efficient
and frictionless capital markets, payout policy is irrelevant. In such a world, rational
investors do not have any preference for dividends over capital gains. However,
subsequent literature has suggested that factors such as taxes, institutional ownership
constraints, transaction costs, and the time horizons of investors might affect investor
preferences (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Black and Scholes, 1974; Graham and Kumar,
2006). Baker and Wurgler (2004a) relax the assumption of perfectly efficient capital
markets in the Miller and Modigliani model to propose a catering theory of dividends.
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) find that the managerial decision to pay
dividends is driven by investor demand for dividend-paying firms. When investors value
dividends, they assign a higher valuation to firms that pay dividends. Managers see this
valuation difference and initiate dividends to capture the “premium.” Baker and Wurgler
calculate their main proxy, the value-weighted dividend premium, as the difference in the
logarithm of the value-weighted market-to-book ratio (M/B) of dividend payers and nonpayers. Li and Lie (2005) extend the Baker and Wurgler study to show that dividend
catering works not only for initiation of dividends, but also for increases and decreases in
the level of dividend payments. Li and Lie also find that the capital markets reward
managers for paying attention to the investor demand for dividends. A different line of
literature documents the changing nature of firms that pay dividends (e.g., Fama and
French, 2001) and the increasing importance of repurchases in corporate payout policy
(e.g., Skinner, 2008). Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that US firms finance their
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share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends.
The authors offer the tax-advantaged status of repurchases and a rule change1 by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as reasons contributing to the substitution of
dividend payments with share repurchases. Brown et al. (2007) find evidence supporting
a move from repurchases to dividends, specifically in response to a change in tax rates in
2003. I propose catering as a motivation for the observed substitution.
In this paper, I present a catering view of the payout decision. I posit that the
choice between repurchases and dividends is a rational managerial response to changing
valuations assigned to firms that repurchase shares versus those that pay dividends. Some
investors, driven by their time-varying demands, may prefer to hold shares of firms that
are repurchasing shares over those that are paying dividends. This demand drives apart
the valuations of firms that follow different payout methods, within the limits of
arbitrage. Managers rationally cater to this investor demand by repurchasing shares
(paying dividends) when investors assign higher valuation to repurchasing (dividendpaying) firms. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) present a catering theory of dividends using
similar arguments. They, however, do not discuss share repurchases. I extend the Baker
and Wurgler dividend catering theory to share repurchases, while considering the demand
for repurchasing and dividend-paying firms together.

1

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b–18 provides a voluntary “safe harbor”
from liability for manipulation under Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), and Rule 10b–5 under the Exchange Act, when an issuer or its affiliated purchaser bids for
or purchases shares of the issuer's common stock in accordance with the Rule 10b–18's manner, timing,
price, and volume conditions. These conditions are: (1) on any one day, firms may not purchase more than
25% of the average daily volume of their own shares during the prior four weeks; (2) firms may not
purchase their own shares at the opening and closing one–half hours of trading; (3) firms may not purchase
their own shares at a price higher than the last independent bid, or the last reported sale price; and (4) all
purchases on a single day must be executed through the same brokerage firm. This rule was adopted in
November 1982 and caused an increase in the number of open market repurchase programs adopted (see
Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Ikenberry et al., 1995; etc.).
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Researchers have documented evidence of catering in other corporate decisions.
For example, Baker et al. (2009) show evidence of catering in nominal share prices;
Aghion and Stein (2008) find that managers choose between sales growth and profit
margins; and Polk and Sapienza (2009) show that mispricing can be driven by levels of
investment. To test the catering hypothesis in payout policy, I first calculate the yearly
M/B of firms for each year in the period 1971–2010. I then find the yearly difference in
the logarithm of the value-weighted M/B of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. I
use this measure as a proxy for the excess valuation that the market assigns to firms that
repurchase shares, i.e., the “repurchase premium.”2 This proxy is constructed to give a
measure comparable to the Baker and Wurgler (2004a) (value-weighted) dividend
premium. To capture the relative preference for repurchases over dividends, I define the
“difference premium” as the difference between my repurchase premium and the Baker
and Wurgler dividend premium. Intuition suggests that firms will find repurchasing
shares more attractive, relative to paying dividends, when this difference premium is
positive.
I consider the variation in the difference premium proxy over time. Using logit
analysis, I find that firms are more likely to repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the
difference premium is positive (negative). Hence, the decision to pay dividends or to
repurchase shares is based on the relative values of the dividend and the repurchase
premium. This finding supports Grullon and Michaely’s (2002) substitution hypothesis. If
catering explains the observed substitution between repurchases and dividends, then

2

Contrary to some previous mentions in the literature (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005), the term “repurchase
premium” here does not signify the premium that firms have to pay to buy back their own shares (e.g.,
greenmail).
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managers must consider both premiums and decide to substitute one form of payout for
the other based on the relative magnitudes of the two premiums. My results hold after
controlling for taxes, the 1982 SEC rule change, risk measures (Hoberg and Prabhala,
2009), unobserved firm fixed effects, and other usual firm proxies (e.g., size, capital
structure, cash holdings, etc.).
My paper makes several additional contributions to the literature. First, I find that
the difference premium explains the residual “propensity to repurchase” after accounting
for time-varying firm characteristics, including investment opportunities, profitability,
and firm size, using the Fama and French (2001) methodology. The Baker and Wurgler
dividend premium cannot account for this repurchasing decision after controlling for risk
characteristics (as explained in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)3), but the difference premium
can.
Second, I find that the repurchase premium is negatively correlated with the
Baker and Wurgler dividend premium (correlation coefficient of -0.124), reflecting the
competing attractiveness of repurchases and dividends. The dividend premium alone, in
the presence of control variables for risk, cannot capture the attractiveness of repurchases
to dividend payers. This relative attractiveness ties together the dividend and the
repurchase premiums and highlights that the dividend premium by itself cannot entirely
explain share-repurchasing activity.
Third, I find that firms switch from paying dividends to repurchasing shares when
the difference premium is positive. I use the Lintner (1956) dividend model to predict the
3

Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) observe that measures of idiosyncratic and systematic risk are key
determinants in the “propensity to pay dividends.” They show that the catering explanation of dividend
payment loses explanatory power when they control for firm-level risk. However, my results in favor of
catering-based substitution between repurchases and dividends hold after controlling for the Hoberg and
Prabhala risk variables.
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expected dividend behaviors of firms that repurchase shares and pay dividends, and find a
negative relation between dividend forecast errors and the difference premium. In other
words, firms pay less than the expected dividend when the repurchase premium is higher
than the dividend premium. I also look at changes in total payout and investigate how
additional payout dollars are distributed between share repurchases and dividend
payments. I find that firms are more likely to channel any increases in total payout toward
share repurchases when the difference premium is positive, in line with catering-based
substitution. I also look at the investor reaction to announcements of dividend changes
and investigate if this reaction is driven by catering. I find that investors react more
favorably to announcements of a dividend increase by non-repurchasing firms when
firms act in accordance with the predictions of the catering hypothesis. Conversely, when
the changes in the difference premium predict that firms should decrease dividends and
repurchase shares, and firms follow suit, investors greet these announcements less
unfavorably. All of these results confirm that catering plays a role in substitution between
dividends and share repurchases.
This is one of the first papers to suggest catering as a potential explanation for the
substitution effect found by numerous studies (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and
Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008). The extant literature does not explore how preferences
for dividend payments and share repurchases correlate through time and how these
correlations relate to firms’ payout policies. My paper addresses these questions. Even
though dividends and repurchases are competing methods of paying shareholders, the
idea of catering based on the relative magnitude of dividend and repurchase premiums is
unique to this paper. The results in this paper also shed light on a possible reason why
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firms may announce repurchases in clusters. If the catering view holds, more managers
are likely to buy back shares when the repurchase premium is higher than the dividend
premium, thereby leading to clustering. These results might also explain the cyclical
nature of repurchases. Because the investor demand for shares of repurchasing firms
varies, the valuations assigned to firms that repurchase shares also changes. Managers
react to this varying demand by changing the supply (affecting the rate of initiations and
continuations of repurchases).
In a contemporaneous study, Jiang et al. (2012) also investigate how the catering
theory applies to share repurchases. They calculate a repurchase premium proxy based on
frequent and infrequent repurchasers and find that firms are more likely to initiate and
continue share repurchases when the repurchase premium is high. The authors also find
that the fraction of shares repurchased by firms is positively related to the repurchase
premium. Their evidence also supports the hypothesis that catering plays a role in the
observed substitution between share repurchases and dividend payments. While Jiang et
al. control for the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium in their tests, they do not
consider the difference between the repurchase and the dividend premiums. The
difference premium allows me to see how the relative attractiveness of the two premiums
affects two competing methods of paying shareholders, namely share repurchases and
dividend payouts. I also investigate how the difference premium affects the distribution
of additional payout dollars between share repurchases and dividend payments, the
deviations from the “expected” dividend payment behavior based on the Lintner (1956)
model, and the abnormal announcement returns surrounding dividend increases and cuts.
Overall, my paper focuses on investigating the catering-based substitution and the
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importance of the relative magnitudes of the repurchase and the dividend premium while
Jiang et al. confirm more initiation and continuation of repurchases when their repurchase
premium is high.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the main
assumptions and intuitive framework for repurchase catering and catering-based
substitution. Section 3 explains the data and results of empirical tests. Section 4
concludes.
2. Payout Catering
I develop an intuitive framework to analyze the payout decision of firms, along
the lines of Baker and Wurgler (2004a). When deciding on their payout policies,
managers consider many variables such as investment opportunities, cash holdings,
capital structure, agency issues, and signaling implications (e.g., Allen and Michaely,
2003; Brav et al., 2005). Managers face the choice between repurchasing shares and
paying dividends, the two most frequently used ways of paying back to shareholders
(Allen and Michaely, 2003). In the Miller and Modigliani (1961) perfect capital markets
world, this choice has a zero value consequence.
Assume that there are two broad types of investors in this world, category
investors and arbitrageurs. Category investors prefer firms that payout to shareholders.
These investors are divided into two subcategories: those that repurchase shares and those
that pay dividends. In the spirit of Rosch (1978) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003),
category investors put firms that repurchase shares and those that pay dividends into
separate investment categories. Possible reasons for this categorization are tax clienteles
(similar to Black and Scholes, 1974 and Allen et al., 2000), time horizon of investments
9

(Graham and Kumar, 2006), the perception that repurchases signal undervaluation
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Vermaelen, 1981), high
expected future returns (Massa et al., 2007; Vermaelen, 1981), and even a popular belief
that share repurchases are a shareholder-friendly activity (Sanders and Carpenter, 2003;
Westphal and Zajac, 2001).
This category-based demand may lead to an irrational expectation about the value
of the firm. For example, category investors may categorize because they view nonrepurchasers (or non-dividend payers) as high-growth firms and might judge the future
prospects of repurchasers (dividend payers) relative to their current assessment of growth
opportunities. Similar cases can be made for other motivations behind categorization.
Category investors assign different valuations to the firm: VR if the firm repurchases
shares, and VNR if the firm does not repurchase shares. Similarly, they assign a value of
VD and VND to firms that pay dividends and those that do not, respectively. They
misestimate the mean value but not the distribution around the mean. Typically, VR and
VNR fall on opposite sides of the true fundamental value, just as VD and VND do in Baker
and Wurgler (2004a).
Arbitragers, in comparison, have rational expectations and know the long-run cost
of repurchasing shares and paying dividends. The level of risk aversion among
arbitrageurs and category investors might define the limits of arbitrage. With limited
arbitrage, the perceptions of category investors cause the relative prices of share
repurchasers and dividend payers to differ. In the presence of such pricing differences,
managers cater to investor demand (of category investors) by paying out when they think
that the net gain to catering is positive.
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When deciding the method of payout, managers look at the premiums (i.e.,
valuation differences between the different categories) to maximize the firm value. If the
observed difference between the repurchase premium and the dividend premium is
positive, managers will channel the payout dollars to repurchases. Conversely, if the
difference premium is negative, managers pay through dividends. This framework
provides the basic intuitive argument for catering-based substitution.
Empirically, this catering hypothesis posits that firms will buy back shares when
investor demand for firms that are repurchasing shares is high. More specifically,
repurchases (dividends) are positively (negatively) related to the lagged values of the
difference premium.
I realize that repurchases and dividends are not perfect substitutes. Dividends tend
to be sticky (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Fama and French, 2002), so it is unreasonable to
expect that all dividend-paying firms will cut their payout to zero and start repurchasing
simply because the difference premium is positive. Thus, my catering hypothesis posits
that firms tune their payout policies to the trends of the difference premium and that the
threshold premium for a firm to change its payout policy may differ based on firm
characteristics. Some firms, possibly smaller firms without a long history of dividends,
might start repurchasing shares when the magnitude of the difference premium is low, but
that threshold for a larger firm with a long history of dividends could be higher.
Many studies have considered a “clientele effect” or “catering” as a motivation
for many corporate decisions (e.g., Aghion and Stein, 2008; Baker et al., 2009; Polk and
Sapienza, 2009). Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggest that dividend clienteles may form
based on investor characteristics. Firms that pay higher (lower) dividends might attract
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investors who prefer (dislike) dividend income because of marginal tax rates, age, or
income concerns. Graham and Kumar (2006) analyze investor holdings and find that
some older investors strongly prefer dividend-paying firms. Shefrin and Statman (1984)
argue that “mental accounting” might influence preferences, whereby investors code for
gains and losses across investments using prospect theory functions. Shefrin and Thaler
(1988) and Thaler and Shefrin (1981) find that regret aversion, self-control problems, and
life cycle preferences might also influence investors’ preferences for dividends. While
clienteles for dividends have been extensively studied (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Black and
Scholes, 1974), clientele effects driving repurchase decisions have not. Baker and
Wurgler (2004a) develop a catering theory of dividends, but they do not consider
“repurchase catering,” or how dividend catering and repurchase catering might be related.
This paper builds on the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium. Because it is
quantifiable, I can use it to study the relative attractiveness of dividends and share
repurchases, after developing corresponding measures of the repurchase premium.
3. Data and Empirical Tests
3.1 Repurchase premium variables
Firm-level data for this study are gathered from the Compustat database. The
sample period is 1971–2010. To be included in my sample for calculating the premiums,
the firm must have the following data in year t (Compustat variable names in
parentheses): total assets (AT), stock price (PRCC_F) and shares outstanding (CSHO),
income before extraordinary items (IB), interest expense (XINT) [cash] dividends per
share by the ex-date (DVPSX_F), preferred dividends (DVP), and (a) preferred stock
liquidating value (PSTKL), (b) preferred stock redemption value (PSTKRV), or (c)
12

preferred stock carrying value (PSTK). Firms must also have stockholder equity (SEQ),
liabilities (LT), or common equity (CEQ); share price at calendar year end (PRCC_C);
and preferred stock par value (PSTK). Following Fama and French (2001), I exclude
firms with book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000. I also require that the
amount spent on the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) be reported. In
calculating the total repurchase amount for a firm-year observation, this data item
(PRSTKC) is adjusted by decreases in the preferred stock redemption value (PSTKRV)
from the year before. As discussed in Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar (2000),
this adjustment takes care of the conversion of preferred stock into common stock, the
retirement of preferred stock, and the retirement or redemption of redeemable preferred
stock. If the repurchase amount, after this adjustment, is positive and at least 1% of the
market value of equity, then I consider the firm a repurchaser for the year (otherwise the
firm is a non-repurchaser). If a firm has positive dividends per share by ex-date, it is
identified as a dividend payer. I exclude utilities and financial firms (Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) codes 4900–4949 and 6000–6999) from the sample.
Repurchase Premium is the difference in the logarithm of the M/B weighted by
the book-value of assets of firms that are classified as repurchasers and non-repurchasers
in a year. M/B is constructed following Fama and French (2001). Dividend Premium is
the value-weighted dividend premium from Baker and Wurgler (2004a). I use data from
their study through year 2000, and use their methodology to construct this variable for the
remainder of the time series. The difference between the repurchase premium and the
dividend premium is the Difference Premium. Table 1 shows the values of the payout
premiums, and Figure 1 shows these premiums by year.
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Compustat started reporting data on repurchases in 1971. In late 1982, the SEC
adopted Rule 10b-18, which had a major impact on repurchase activity (see Grullon and
Michaely, 2002 and footnote 1). In 1983, the difference premium rose moderately. The
difference between the repurchase and the dividend premiums is close to zero after 1986.
This matches the expected outcome of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which reduced the
difference between the capital gains and income tax rates.4 The difference premium
favors repurchases throughout the early 1990s and falls at the end of 1997. The high
difference in premiums for most of the 1990s matches well with the reported rise in
repurchases during that time (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002). A drop in the repurchase
premium around 2003 likely stems from the Bush tax cuts,5 which made repurchasing
shares less favorable.6 At the onset of the recent financial crisis in 2007, the difference
premium drops below zero. Figure 1 captures some key historic changes that potentially
affected the substitution decision of US firms.
Note that a difference premium of 10% does not imply that a firm that stops
dividend payouts and initiates share repurchases will see a 10% jump in its share price.
Firms that follow different payout policies might differ on a number of characteristics,

4

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the top tax rate from 50% to 28%, while the bottom rate was raised
from 11% to 15%—the first time in the history of the U.S. income tax that the top rate was reduced and the
bottom rate was increased concomitantly. In addition, capital gains faced the same tax rate as ordinary
income.
5
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) accelerated the gradual rate
reduction and increase in credits passed in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA). The maximum tax rate decreases originally scheduled to be phased into effect in 2006
under EGTRRA were retroactively enacted to apply to the 2003 tax year. JGTRRA increased both the
percentage rate at which items can be depreciated and the amount a taxpayer may choose to expense. In
addition, the capital gains tax decreased from rates of 8%, 10%, and 20% to 5% and 15%.
6
My data show a drop in the value weighted dividend premium in 2003. When I construct the equallyweighted dividend premium measure, following Baker and Wurgler (2004a), I do not observe this drop.
This leads me to believe that firms with high book-value of assets and low M/B joined the group of
dividend payers in the wake of JGTRAA, creating this anomaly. See Brown et al. (2007) for a discussion
on how incentives, including managerial ownership, played a role in the dividend payment decision of
firms around that time.
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such as size, maturity, and profitability, which the difference-in-premiums approach does
not capture. These firm characteristics, unlike the decision to repurchase shares or pay
out dividends, may not be under managerial control. When used here as a proxy, M/B is
meant to capture valuation, and the difference premium is meant to capture relative
valuation between repurchasers and dividend payers. However, M/B is also used in the
literature as a proxy for growth options (e.g., Denis and Osobov, 2005). As such, a
disadvantage of this proxy is that it captures growth options of repurchasers relative to
dividend payers; therefore, I control for firm-level M/B in pertinent regression.
I create several variables to control for known effects on payout policy decisions
(e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2001;
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Kahle (2002). When used in regressions as control variables, all
independent variables are calculated with a lag of one fiscal year (and represented with a
subscript of t-1 in the tables). When used to control for effects in the same time period,
contemporaneous variables are used (and represented with a subscript of t in the tables).
LnAssets is the logarithm of total assets. Debt is defined as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled
by the book-value of assets. Cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents (CHE) scaled
by the book-value of assets. ROA is the return on assets, defined as the operating income
(OIBDP) scaled by the book-value of assets. Std. Dev. ROA is the standard deviation of
the ROA, calculated over the last three years. Tax is the difference between the highest
prevalent rate in income tax over capital gains tax. FCF is the free cash flow, defined as
the gross operating income (OIBDP) minus the sum of depreciation (DP), tax payments
(TXT), interest expenses (XINT), and dividends scaled by the book-value of assets. Std.
Dev. FCF is the standard deviation of the FCF, calculated over the last three years.
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Return is the return on the stock price of the firm over the current fiscal year. Nonoperating Income is the non-operating income before depreciation (NOPI) scaled by the
book-value of assets. Repurchase Yield (Dividend Yield) is calculated by scaling the
dollar amount of repurchases (dividends) by the market value of equity.
I also create variables to control for risk, as suggested by Hoberg and Prabhala
(2009). NYP is the NYSE market capitalization percentile, i.e., the fraction of NYSE
firms having equal or smaller capitalization. Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation
of residuals from a regression of the firm’s daily excess stock returns on the market factor
(i.e., the CRSP value-weighted market return less the riskfree rate). One firm-year value
of idiosyncratic risk is computed using returns data from one calendar year. Systematic
Risk is the standard deviation of the predicted value from the idiosyncratic risk
calculation.
3.2 Firm-level decision to repurchase shares or to pay dividends
First, I investigate the firm-level decision to repurchase shares or to pay
dividends. I test how the difference between the repurchase and the dividend premium
affects the payout choice after controlling for firm characteristics. Table 2 shows the
results of these tests. Specification 1 shows the result of a logit regression to model the
decision to pay dividends using data on all sample firms between 1972 and 2010. The
coefficient on the difference premium is negative and significant, suggesting that firms
are more likely to pay dividends when the difference premium is negative (i.e., the
dividend premium is greater than the repurchase premium). In specification 2, I run a
similar logit regression on the decision to repurchase shares. The coefficient on the
difference premium is positive and significant, suggesting that firms are more likely to
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repurchase shares when the difference premium is positive (i.e., the repurchase premium
is greater than the dividend premium). These results are similar to Jiang et al. (2012) who
find that that firms are more (less) likely to repurchase shares when their repurchase (the
Baker and Wurgler dividend) premium is high (low).
Grullon and Michaely (2002), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and others point
out the importance of SEC Rule 10b-18 passed in 1982. Repurchases became more
prevalent after this rule was enacted. To control for any biases resulting from this rule
change, I run a regression (specification 3) to model the decision to repurchase shares
using data from 1983 onwards. In specification 4, I run a similar regression for the period
1971–2006, ending just before the onset of the financial crisis of 2007. The results remain
unaffected by these time-period choices. Finally, to control for unobserved firm
heterogeneity, I run a firm fixed-effects logit regression model (specification 5). The
difference premium continues to be positively related to the decision to repurchase
shares, ruling out any systematic unobserved firm-level variable driving these results.7
The decision to repurchase shares or to pay dividends is affected by the difference
premium, after controlling for tax rate differentials between income and capital gains,
measures of firm-level risk, the 1982 SEC rule change regarding share repurchase
guidelines, the recent US financial crisis, and other unobserved firm fixed effects. This
shows strong support for the catering hypothesis, indicating that firms are more likely to

7

When running a logit regression with firm fixed effects, if the dependent variable does not change for a
firm during the sample period, all observations for that firm are dropped from the test. Hence, the number
of observations drops from 85,678 in specification 2 to 54,678 in specification 5 of Table 2. The 54,678
observations for this specification are for firms that paid dividends and repurchased shares at some time
during the sample period.
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repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the repurchase premium is greater (smaller) than
the dividend premium.8
I also perform robustness checks by repeating the logit regressions shown in
specifications 1 and 2 of my Table 2 but replacing my difference premium proxy with the
Jiang et al. (2012) value-weighted repurchase premium (not shown). I find a significant
and negative (positive) coefficient on the Jiang et al. VW repurchase premium proxy
when modeling the decision to pay dividends (repurchase shares). I get similar and
statistically significant results when I replace the difference premium proxy with my
repurchase premium proxy. When I create a proxy similar to that of Jiang et al., using
repurchase classification over multiple years, I get results similar to the repurchase
premium proxy used in this paper. These results further show that the Jiang et al.
repurchase premium proxy and my repurchase premium proxy are related.9 Banyi et al.
(2008) evaluate the accuracy of multiple share repurchase measures and conclude that the
Compustat purchase of common stock, which I use, is a better measure for the actual
number of shares repurchased by firms than the number of shares outstanding listed in the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, which Jiang et al. use. While
doing their robustness checks, Jiang et al. also note that their results hold when they use
Compustat-based purchase of common stock as a proxy for share repurchases.
Taken together, these results show that the decision to pay dividends or to
repurchase shares is related to the relative magnitude of the two premiums. Firms are
8

In unreported results, I also run regressions on all specifications reported in Table 2 with variables to
control for time trend and also with dummy variables to control for industry characteristics (using the 48
industry dummies of Fama and French (1997) and two- and three-digit SIC codes). The results are strongly
significant in all these cases.
9

In my sample period of 1971–2010, the Jiang et al. unadjusted value-weighted (VW) repurchase
premium proxy and my repurchase premium proxy are significantly positively correlated (correlation
coefficient of 0.688 with a p-value less than .001).
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more likely to repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the difference premium is positive
(negative). These results show that the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium should be
considered relative to the repurchase premium when modeling the decision to repurchase
shares or the decision to pay dividends. Prior literature (Grullon and Michaely, 2002;
Skinner, 2008; etc.) has discussed firms substituting one form of payout with the other,
but this is the first evidence hinting at competing clienteles driving payout decisions. My
results show that the relative magnitudes of the two premiums affect the decision to
repurchase shares or to pay dividends.
3.3 Controlling for time-varying firm characteristics
Fama and French (2001) find that three fundamentals—profitability, investment
opportunities, and size—factor into the decision to pay dividends. In this section, I look
at the possibility that the difference premium is related to the cross-sectional distribution
of payout-relevant characteristics of dividend payers and share repurchasers. For
example, suppose that earnings of repurchasing firms increase when the repurchase
premium is higher than the dividend premium (i.e., the difference premium is positive).
In such a situation, the probability to repurchase shares may be driven by the excess cash
(realized from higher earnings) that repurchasers have and not by the difference
premium. Specifically, I examine whether the difference premium helps to explain the
residual variation in the repurchase decision after controlling directly for sample
characteristics, particularly those found to be significant by Fama and French. I include
the same variables when I model the repurchase behavior, captured in the following
equation:
(1)
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NYP is as defined previously. M/B is the market-to-book ratio as defined previously,
with the slight modification that here I use the fiscal year-end stock price instead of the
calendar year-end stock price. Growth in book assets (dA/A) is calculated as the change
in asset size between year t-1 and t, scaled by assets. Profitability (E/A) is the earnings
before extraordinary items (IB) plus interest expenses (XINT) plus income statement
deferred taxes (TXDI) divided by the book-value of assets.
This test is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, following Fama and French,
I estimate a set of yearly Fama-MacBeth logit regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973)
from 1972 to 2010 on the decision to repurchase shares, controlling for firm
characteristics. The yearly coefficients estimated as a result of the logit regression (and
the values of the explanatory variables) are then used to estimate the expected probability
of repurchasing shares for each firm. Then, I calculate the prediction errors (actual policy
minus predicted policy) for each firm. The error term, u, shown in equation (1), thus
captures the residual probability of repurchasing shares. I sum the residuals by year and
calculate the average error by dividing the summed residual error by the number of firms
in the sample for that year t. The averaged residual is the yearly “propensity to
repurchase,” or PTR, after controlling for firm-level variation in size, growth options, and
profitability. In the second stage, I see if this average annual residual is driven by the
lagged value of the variable of interest, Pt-1:
,
(2)
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The regression in equation (2) aims to explicitly remove the effect of time-varying
characteristics, and the two-stage approach allows the difference premium to explain only
the residual variation, after taking firm characteristics into account.
First, I run the above described regressions for all sample firms using data from
1972–2010. Panel A of Table 3 shows results for the second stage of the regression.
Specification 1 shows the results when the lagged difference premium is regressed on the
propensity to repurchase. The coefficient on the difference premium is positive and
significant, indicating that the difference premium can explain the residual propensity to
repurchase shares, after controlling for size, M/B, and profitability. Specification 2 shows
the results when the propensity to repurchase is regressed on the lagged value of the
Baker and Wurgler dividend premium variable. The coefficient on the dividend premium
variable is negative, in line with the Grullon and Michaely (2002) substitution hypothesis,
and the Baker and Wurgler (2004a) finding that the “propensity to pay dividends” is
positively related to the dividend premium.
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find that the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium
cannot explain the propensity to pay dividends in the presence of measures controlling
for the firm-level idiosyncratic and systematic risks. To see how the difference premium
behaves in the presence of these risk measures, I change the first stage of the above
described regression to include terms for idiosyncratic and systematic risks (in addition to
the four variables originally used to capture size, growth options, and profitability), as
described in Hoberg and Prabhala. Results (in specification 3) show that including these
risk measures in the first stage of the regression does not change the sign or significance
of the difference premium in the second-stage regression. However, in line with the
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Hoberg and Prabhala finding, adding the risk measures in the first stage of the regression
results in the dividend premium variable losing its significance in the second stage of the
regression (see specification 4). This shows that the difference premium has explanatory
power in predicting the probability of repurchasing shares after controlling for firm-level
variation in size, growth options, profitability, and risk measures. The Hoberg and
Prabhala risk variables soak up the significance of the dividend premium in explaining
the decision to pay dividends, but the relative attractiveness of dividends over
repurchases (captured by the difference premium variable) still has explanatory power in
the decision to repurchase shares. This may be driven by the nature of the repurchase
decision timing (decided after investment decisions, as suggested by the Brav et al.
(2005) survey) or the inherent flexibility that share repurchases offer (compared with that
of dividend payments, which tend to be “sticky”).
After looking at the repurchasing decision of all firms in the sample, I model the
repurchasing decision of dividend-paying firms. I restrict my sample (for the FamaMacBeth regressions) to only the dividend-paying firms. I use the method described
earlier to calculate the probability that the dividend-paying firms repurchase shares, and
then I calculate the residual propensity to repurchase shares. I then test if the lagged
values of the difference premium can explain variations in the propensity to repurchase
shares by dividend-paying firms. Panel B of Table 3 shows the corresponding results.
The dividend-paying firms are more likely to repurchase shares when the lagged value of
the difference premium is positive. Controlling for the Hoberg and Prabhala risk
measures does not decrease the significance level of this result. Interestingly, the Baker
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and Wurgler dividend premium does not significantly explain the repurchasing choice of
dividend-paying firms.
These results show that the difference premium can explain share repurchasing
activity after controlling for the time-varying firm characteristics, including the Hoberg
and Prabhala (2009) risk variables. The main results hold in the broad universe of
Compustat firms and in a subsample of dividend-paying firms, demonstrating that the
difference premium has explanatory power beyond that of the dividend premium alone.
The difference premium captures the relative attractiveness of repurchases over
dividends, while the dividend premium captures the attractiveness of dividends alone.10, 11
3.4 Deviation from the expected dividend payout and the role of catering in
substitution
Next, I evaluate the evidence related to firm-level substitution of repurchases for
dividends to determine if catering plays a role in this substitution. I use a modified
Lintner (1956) analysis of how firms determine their dividend policy. In the spirit of
Skinner (2008), I separate firms that have repurchased shares and paid dividends in at
least half of the years in my sample period. Using my sample period of 1971–2010, I
separate firms that exist for the entire period and have paid dividends and repurchased
10

Because M/B is also sometimes used as a proxy for investment opportunities, Fama and French (2001)
also estimate a model for the first-stage regression without M/B in the specification for the Fama-MacBeth
logit regression. When I replicate that procedure (and drop M/B from equation 1 while estimating
coefficients for the annual logit regressions), my results are unchanged. Also, for the sake of brevity, I
show only results for the propensity to repurchase (PTR), but when I model the corresponding propensity to
pay dividends, I get similar results. The coefficient on the lagged value of the dividend premium variable is
positive (as expected from the competing nature of dividends and repurchases for the same payout dollars).
The coefficient on the lagged value of the difference premium is negative and significant at the 10% level.
11
Results are robust to changing the specification in equation 1 to add variables for the one-year growth in
sales (between year t-1 and t) of the firm, the logarithm of one plus the firm’s age in the CRSP database,
the logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns (over the year t), and the current
retained earnings (divided by assets), as in Grullon et al. (2011). When the “propensity to repurchase”
calculated from the first stage regression with the above described control variables (in addition to the four
Fama-French variables and the variables for systematic and idiosyncratic risk) is regressed on the lagged
difference premium, the coefficient on the difference premium variable is positive and significant.
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shares in at least 20 of these 40 years. This helps narrow my sample to a probable list of
firms that are equally likely to pay dividends or repurchase shares. I do not require that a
firm does both in the same year. I also do not impose any restrictions on when the payout
occurred—in the early or the late part of the sample period—or whether they occurred in
consecutive years or not. Using the Lintner model, I estimate the expected dividend
payment for a firm based on its past dividend payment behavior. I then calculate
deviations from the expected dividend payment by comparing the expected and the actual
dividend payment of a firm. The deviation from the expected dividend payout is captured
by the residual dividend error, defined as:
(3)
For a firm i, ΔDIVi,t is the actual change in dividends, and EARNi,t captures earnings in
year t. MVi,t-1 is the market value of equity for firm i in year t-1. The

coefficients are

estimated for each firm individually, using data from 1971–1990 (roughly half the sample
period). These parameter estimates are then used to calculate the residual dividend error
for the same firms during 1991–2010 (roughly the second half of the sample period).12
This Error captures the difference between the actual and the predicted dividend change
for a firm in a given year, scaled by the market value of equity. I regress this residual
dividend error on firm characteristics to find out what causes firms to deviate from the
expected dividend payout behavior. Following Grullon and Michaely (2002), I use debt,
non-operating income, ROA, the repurchase yield, and the standard deviation of ROA as
control variables. The substitution hypothesis predicts that if firms are substituting funds
12

At the suggestion of the referee, I repeated the same test by gathering a sample of firms that exist only
for the entire estimation period 1971–1990 (and may or may not be missing from the second half of the
time period, i.e., 1991–2010). For this robustness check, I also drop any extreme residual dividend error
(absolute value greater than 5%). Results supporting catering-based substitution are also significant in this
bigger sample.
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to be used for dividends with repurchases, the residual dividend error will be negatively
related to the repurchase yield. If catering plays a role in this substitution, the difference
premium should be significant in explaining the residual dividend error. Table 4 shows
these results.
Results in specification 1 support the Grullon and Michaely (2002) substitution
hypothesis. The negative and significant relation between the residual dividend error and
the repurchase yield suggests that firms repurchase more shares when the actual dividend
is lower than the expected dividend. The substitution result holds when the Hoberg and
Prabhala (2009) risk variables are introduced in specification 2. The negative sign on the
repurchase yield persists when I introduce the difference premium in specification 3. The
coefficient on the difference premium is also negative and significant, showing that the
actual dividend is lower than the predicted dividend when the difference premium is
positive. This supports a catering-based substitution.
Overall, this result supports the view that funds that were to be used to pay
dividends are instead being used to repurchase shares when the difference premium is
positive. Firms substitute repurchases for dividends in line with predictions of the
catering hypothesis. The negative relation between the difference premium and the
residual dividend error, similar to the negative relation between the repurchase yield and
the residual dividend error, shows that catering plays a role in the previously documented
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002) substitution.
3.5 Distribution of net payout between share repurchases and dividend payments
Recent evidence suggests that looking at total cash payout rather than any form of
payout alone (e.g., Boudoukh et al., 2007; Grullon et al., 2011) might be more
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appropriate. I next investigate how the difference premium affects the distribution of total
payout between share repurchases and dividend payments. I calculate the Total Payout,
the sum of dividends and share repurchases, for a firm as well as the changes in total
payout compared to the previous year. Similarly, I also determine the changes in dividend
payments and the changes in shares repurchases for a firm. I then calculate the fraction of
the change in total payout that goes to incremental share buyback, defined as the change
in share repurchase divided by the change in total payout. Intuitively, this ratio represents
the fraction of an additional dollar of total payout used toward share repurchases. A
positive fractional change in this measure results in an increase in share repurchases
when the total payout increases. I investigate if the difference premium can explain how
firms allocate additional payout dollars toward repurchases. Table 5 shows the results of
these ordinary least squares (OLS) and tobit regressions.
After controlling for size, M/B, change in ROA, risk measures, I find that the
OLS regression coefficient on the lagged difference premium is positive and significant.13
This indicates that firms use a higher fraction of additional payout dollars toward
repurchases when the difference premium is positive. Results are strong for the entire
sample period and for the period after the 1982 SEC rule change (shown in specifications
1 and 2, respectively). I also run a tobit regression to explain the fraction of the change in

13

The negative coefficient on the Tax variable is a little puzzling in these regressions. Considering that the
Tax variable is defined as the difference between capital gains and the ordinary income tax rates, the
negative sign seems to indicate that firms channel additional payout toward repurchases when the rate of
the ordinary income tax is higher than that of the capital gains tax. In unreported results, I find that this sign
is sensitive to specific time periods. When the data for the OLS and tobit regressions is restricted to years
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the sign on the Tax variable is positive and significant (and the sign on
the Difference Premium variable remains positive and significant). Thus, the negative sign on the Tax
variable appears to be driven by the higher-than-expected allocation of incremental payout dollars toward
dividends between 1972 and 1986, in spite of the unfavorable tax treatment of dividends. Black (1976), and
others, have talked specifically about this puzzling phenomenon of firms preferring to pay dividends in
spite of tax disadvantages, and named it the “Dividend Puzzle.”
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total payout that goes toward share repurchases. Results in specification 3 show that a
higher fraction of the change in total payout is channeled toward share repurchases when
the difference premium is positive.
Jiang et al. (2012) look at the fraction of shares repurchased by firms and find
results confirming the catering hypothesis. They find that firms repurchase more shares
when the repurchase (dividend) premium is high (low). While my results provide insight
into how the incremental payout dollars are divided between share repurchases and
dividend payments, they find that the overall fraction of shares repurchased increases
with the repurchase premium and decreases with the dividend premium.
These results further show that catering plays a significant role in how firms
decide to adjust the fraction of share repurchases in their overall payout policies. A higher
fraction of the incremental dollar of payout goes toward share repurchases when investors
value share repurchases more than dividend payments. This notion of dividing the total
payout with an eye toward the difference premium further supports catering-based
substitution between dividends and share repurchases.
3.6 Market reaction to substitution in line with catering incentives
Presumably, managers cater to the investor demand for a particular payout in an
effort to capture the valuation premium. A related question that remains unanswered is
how investors perceive the managerial action of catering. All else equal, if managers
rationally cater to appease the investor demand for a specific payout, any substitution in
line with catering should be viewed more favorably by investors. Specifically, if the
catering view holds, it is likely that the stock market reaction to announcements leading
to dividend decreases would be significantly less negative when firms decrease dividends
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and repurchase shares in response to catering incentives. If substitution is not driven by
catering, then the market reaction to dividend decreases and share repurchases would not
be driven by the difference premium.
As Grullon and Michaely (2002) point out, testing such a hypothesis is not
simple. It is rare for firms to simultaneously announce a share repurchase and a dividend
reduction because it could signal to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that the
announced repurchase is a perfect substitute for a dividend cut. As a way to get around
this problem, Grullon and Michaely look at announcements of dividend decreases and see
how the prior share-repurchasing activity of firms explains the market response to such
announcements. Research shows that stock market reaction to dividend decreases is
largely negative and to dividend increases is largely positive (e.g., Asquith and Mullins,
1986; Healy and Palepu, 1988). However, in line with substitution hypothesis, Grullon
and Michaely find that the market reaction to announcements of dividend decreases are
less negative when such announcements are made by share-repurchasing firms. I augment
the Grullon and Michaely approach by examining dividend changes—increases as well as
decreases—to see how the market reacts to substitution in the face of changing catering
incentives. Intuition suggests that investors will greet firms more favorably when they
follow investors’ wishes (and cater to their demand for a specific payout) and less
favorably when firms do not.
To test this, I collect a sample of all announcements of changes in cash dividends
between 1972 and 2010, from the CRSP database. We know (e.g., Brav et al., 2005) that
investors view large dividend changes (decreases as well as increases) as very strong
signals. Because dividends and repurchases are not perfect substitutes (e.g., Lee and Rui,
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2007), it is unlikely that the market reaction to large decreases (increases) in dividends
will be anything but negative (positive). Expecting the predictably strong reaction at the
extremes, I turn to smaller changes in dividends. I look at announcements of changes in
quarterly cash dividends that resulted in a dividend reduction or increase between 5 and
25%. For this sample of firms, I calculate the three-day cumulative abnormal return
(CAR), using the event-time window of -1 to +1 trading days around the announcement
of the dividend change. CARs are calculated using the standard event-study methodology
(e.g., Brown and Warner, 1980). The parameters of the market model are estimated over
255 trading days, ending 46 days prior to the announcement, using the CRSP valueweighted index as the market portfolio and requiring a minimum of 100 trading days over
the estimation window.
I separate the announcements of dividend changes into two bins: one containing
the announcements that led to increases in dividends and the other containing the
announcements that led to decreases in dividends. I match the changes in dividends to the
repurchasing activity of the firm. I also measure the change in the difference premium
leading up to the announcement of the dividend change. Then, I classify the results based
on how the market reacts to two predictions of the catering hypothesis. I look at a case
where the catering hypothesis predicts a move toward dividends and away from
repurchases (i.e., the difference premium decreases) and another where the catering
hypothesis predicts a move toward repurchases and away from dividends (i.e., the
difference premium increases). My results support the idea that the market rewards firms
that consider investor demand for a specific type of payout.
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Table 6 shows the mean and median CARs around announcements of dividend
changes (between 5 and 25% of the previous year’s dividend) by firms in the CRSP
database between 1972 and 2010. The left panel includes announcements of dividend
increases when the difference premium decreased. If the catering hypothesis holds, a
decrease in the difference premium suggests that firms should increase dividends and
move away from repurchases. Within this group, I examine how the repurchasing activity
of the firms during the prior fiscal year changes the market response. Separating firms on
repurchasing activity makes it easier to examine the Grullon and Michaely (2002)
substitution relative to the catering hypothesis. For the cases when the difference
premium decreased, the announcement of a dividend increase by non-repurchasing firms
is greeted with a statistically significant average CAR of 1.052%. In the same situation,
firms that did not follow the catering prescription and repurchased shares before
announcing dividend increases see a positive but lower CAR of 0.893%. The difference
in market reaction between the repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms in this group is
negative and significant. This supports the prediction of the catering hypothesis that
investors greet firms more favorably when they pay attention to investor demands.
The right panel of Table 6 includes firms that announced reductions in dividend
payments when the difference premium increased. Catering hypothesis predicts that
increases in the difference premium will be met with more repurchases and decreases in
dividend payments. I find that announcements of dividend decreases by repurchasing
firms under this situation are met with a negative but statistically insignificant CAR (0.103%). In the same situation, announcements of dividend decreases by nonrepurchasing firms see a more negative (-0.705%) and statistically significant CAR. On

30

average, announcements of dividend decreases in line with catering predictions result in a
statistically significant difference of 0.602% in CAR. I find similar results when
comparing the median CARs.
To further control for other factors that could affect the market reaction to
dividend changes, I repeat the tests in a multivariate setting. Table 7 shows the results of
these tests. I use Change percent—the absolute value of the announced percentage change
in dividend—as a control for the size of the dividend change. Consistent with
substitution, I find that the announcements of dividend decreases are met with more
favorable CARs when the firm also repurchases shares. When I add the lagged value of
the difference premium to the regression (specification 3), I find a positive and significant
coefficient on the difference premium variable. This indicates that the market reaction to
a dividend decrease is more positive when the difference premium is positive. The market
reaction to dividend increases indicates that the CARs are higher when the firm did not
repurchase shares and also when the difference premium is negative. These results further
support the catering hypothesis and show that catering plays a role in the substitution
between dividends and repurchases. Investors react more favorably to announcements of
dividend changes when these announcements are in line with the predictions of the
catering hypothesis.
Overall, the univariate and multivariate results for announcements of changes in
dividends show that the market reacts positively to dividend increases and negatively to
dividend decreases. Clearly, there is more to the announcement of dividend changes than
catering alone. However, within this framework, investors react more favorably when the
firms act in line with the predictions of the catering hypothesis. When the difference

31

premium is negative and firms announce a decrease in dividends and repurchase shares,
investors react less unfavorably.
4. Conclusion
Catering hypothesis posits that managers rationally cater to investor demand.
When applied more specifically to payout policy, this hypothesis predicts that managers
are more likely to repurchase shares when the premium investors place on shares of
repurchasing firms is higher than the premium they place on shares of dividend-paying
firms. I propose a proxy for measuring the attractiveness of repurchases—the repurchase
premium. I relate this to the dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) and also
propose a proxy to measure the attractiveness of repurchases over dividends—the
difference premium. Using data from 1971–2010, I find that firms are more likely to
repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the lagged value of the difference premium is
positive (negative). Results support the catering hypothesis after controlling for firm
characteristics, the differences in tax rates between income and capital gains, measures of
firm-level risk, unobserved firm fixed effects, the 1982 SEC rule change that made
repurchases more attractive, and the recent financial crisis.
A contemporaneous study by Jiang et al. (2012) finds that firms are more likely to
initiate and continue share repurchases when investors value firms that frequently
repurchase shares more than those that do not. Jiang et al. also find that the fraction of
shares repurchased increases with their repurchase premium and decreases with the Baker
and Wurgler dividend premium. I find that the difference premium can explain the
propensity to repurchase shares, after controlling for the time-varying firm characteristics
studied by Fama and French (2001) and the risk variables studied by Hoberg and
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Prabhala (2009). The difference premium can also explain the repurchasing activity of
dividend-paying firms. I find catering incentives to be related to deviations from the
predicted payout behavior of firms (modeled using the Lintner (1956) approach).
Evidence suggests that firms deviate from the predicted dividend payment and repurchase
more shares when the difference premium is positive. My results also indicate that firms
channel a higher fraction of the additional payout dollars toward share repurchases when
the difference premium is positive. These results together support the role of catering in
the well-documented substitution of repurchases for dividends (Grullon and Michaely,
2002).
Investors react positively to the news of dividend increases and negatively to the
news of dividend decreases, irrespective of the firm’s share-repurchasing activity. This
fact underlines that dividends and repurchases are not perfect substitutes. However,
investors treat dividend decreases by repurchasing firms more favorably when managers
pay attention to the investor demand for repurchases. Overall, my results show that the
decision to repurchase shares or to pay dividends is driven by the relative magnitude of
the dividend and repurchase premiums. This relative attractiveness of dividends and
repurchases indicates a role for catering in explaining the substitution between
repurchases and dividends.
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Figures and Tables:
Figure 1: Payout Premiums and the Difference Premium
This figure shows the yearly values of the premiums from 1971 to 2010. Repurchasers are firms that have
repurchased shares (as indicated by Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (Compustat data PRSTKC)
after adjustments to the decrease in Preferred Stock Redemption Value (PSTKRV) from the year before)
worth more than 1% of their market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as the per-share
price at the end of the calendar year (PRCC_C) times shares outstanding (CSHO). Non-repurchasers are
firms in the sample that are not classified as Repurchasers. Repurchase Premium is the natural logarithm
of the value-weighted market-to-book (M/B) ratio for repurchasers minus the natural logarithm of the
value-weighted M/B for non-repurchasers. Book-value of assets (AT) is used as the weight in calculating
the value-weighted measures. M/B is defined as in Fama and French (2001). Dividend Premium is the
value-weighted dividend premium (as defined in Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). Data for the dividend
premium until 2000 are as given in the Baker and Wurgler study, and data from 2001–2010 are calculated
using the method described therein. Difference Premium is defined as the repurchase premium minus the
dividend premium. The dotted line, the dashed line, and the solid line show the Repurchase Premium, the
Dividend Premium, and the Difference Premium, respectively. The horizontal axis represents year.
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Table 1: Yearly value of the premiums
This table shows the yearly values of the Repurchase Premium, the Dividend Premium, and the
Difference Premium from 1971 to 2010. Means and standard deviations for the premiums are also
shown.
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Mean
SD

Repurchase
Premium
-0.193
-0.174
-0.209
-0.079
-0.202
0.184
0.016
0.182
0.162
0.137
0.000
-0.163
-0.120
-0.013
0.039
0.038
-0.071
-0.014
-0.035
0.116
0.195
0.116
0.147
0.135
0.198
0.170
0.147
0.083
-0.105
-0.060
0.231
0.204
0.311
0.158
0.067
0.040
-0.166
0.184
0.275
0.161
0.052
0.143

Dividend
Premium
0.182
0.266
0.259
0.132
0.156
0.156
0.046
-0.050
-0.143
-0.221
-0.249
-0.169
-0.262
-0.125
-0.110
-0.073
-0.078
-0.078
-0.087
-0.010
-0.046
-0.053
-0.115
-0.075
-0.151
-0.094
-0.048
0.014
-0.332
-0.206
0.024
0.032
-0.012
-0.029
-0.178
-0.114
-0.095
0.014
0.004
-0.052
-0.049
0.132
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Difference
Premium
-0.375
-0.440
-0.468
-0.211
-0.358
0.028
-0.030
0.232
0.305
0.358
0.249
0.006
0.142
0.112
0.149
0.111
0.007
0.064
0.052
0.126
0.241
0.169
0.262
0.210
0.349
0.264
0.195
0.069
0.227
0.146
0.207
0.171
0.323
0.187
0.245
0.154
-0.071
0.170
0.271
0.213
0.102
0.206

Table 2: Logit Regression on decision to pay dividends/repurchase shares
This table shows results of logit regressions to model the choice to repurchase shares and to pay dividends.
The dependent variable Repurchaser takes a value of 1 if the firm is classified as a repurchaser for a
particular year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable Dividend Payer takes a value of 1 if the firm is
classified as a dividend payer in a particular year and zero otherwise. Repurchase Yield and Dividend Yield
are the dollar amounts spent on repurchases and dividends, respectively, scaled by the market value of
equity. Dollar amounts spent on repurchases are calculated using Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock
(Compustat data PRSTKC) after adjusting for the decrease in Preferred Stock Redemption Value (PSTKRV)
from the year before. Dollar amounts spent on dividends are calculated using the value of common
dividends (DVC). A firm is classified as a dividend payer if the dollar amount spent on dividends is
positive. The Repurchaser classification and the Difference Premium are as defined in Table 1. LnAssets is
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (AT). Debt is the value of long-term debt (DLTT),
scaled by total assets. Cash is the value of cash and cash equivalents (CHE) held by a firm, scaled by total
assets. FCF is the free cash flow, defined as the gross operating income (OIBDP) minus the sum of
depreciation (DP), tax payments (TXT), interest expenses (XINT), and dividends (sum of DVP and DVC)
scaled by total assets. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as the value of the operating income of the
firm (OIBDP) scaled by total assets. Std. Dev. FCF is the standard deviation in the FCF value over the last
three years. Return is the return on the stock price of the firm in the fiscal year. M/B is the market-to-book
ratio measured as in Fama and French (2001). NYP is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market
capitalization percentile, i.e., the fraction of NYSE firms having equal or smaller capitalization.
Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of the firm’s daily excess stock
returns (raw returns less the risk-free rate) on the market factor (i.e., the value-weighted market return from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) less the riskfree rate). Systematic Risk is the standard
deviation of the predicted value from the idiosyncratic risk calculation. NYP, Systematic and Idiosyncratic
risk variables are as defined in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Tax is the difference between the highest
prevalent rate in income tax over capital gains tax. All independent variables are calculated at the end of the
prior fiscal year (and hence represented with a subscript of t-1). Time periods for samples used in the
individual specifications are as mentioned. Specifications 1 through 4 show results of logit regressions.
Specification 5 shows results of a logit regression with firm fixed effects. Reported p-values are based on
robust standard errors (also clustered by firm for specifications 1 through 4). ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Dependent Variable:

Repurchase Yieldt-1
Dividend Yieldt-1
LnAssetst-1
Debt t-1
Casht-1
FCFt-1
ROAt-1
Std. dev FCFt-1
Returnt-1
M/Bt-1
NYPt-1
Idiosyncratic Riskt-1
Systematic Riskt-1
Taxt-1
Difference Premiumt-1
Constant
Firm Fixed Effects
Observations
Pseudo R-Squared

Dividend
Payer
1972-2010
(1)
-1.015
(0.173)
17.723***
(0.000)
0.005
(0.839)
-0.424***
(0.006)
-0.031
(0.856)
4.223***
(0.000)
2.637***
(0.000)
-10.932***
(0.000)
0.037***
(0.000)
-0.206***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.000)
-24.110***
(0.000)
-27.921***
(0.000)
1.366***
(0.000)
-1.403***
(0.000)
-1.150***
(0.000)
No
85,678
0.720

Repurchaser
1972-2010
(2)
25.267***
(0.000)
-0.144***
(0.000)
0.001
(0.939)
-0.134
(0.139)
0.835***
(0.000)
-0.553**
(0.011)
3.182***
(0.000)
-0.734***
(0.001)
-0.035***
(0.003)
-0.064***
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.000)
-7.446***
(0.000)
6.681***
(0.001)
-0.804***
(0.000)
0.592***
(0.000)
-1.413***
(0.000)
No
85,678
0.079
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Repurchaser
1983-2010
(3)
23.097***
(0.000)
-0.059*
(0.085)
-0.086***
(0.000)
-0.172*
(0.080)
0.779***
(0.000)
-0.536**
(0.034)
3.208***
(0.000)
-0.940***
(0.000)
-0.024**
(0.025)
-0.109***
(0.000)
0.013***
(0.000)
-7.282***
(0.000)
10.133***
(0.000)
0.931***
(0.000)
0.723***
(0.000)
-1.376***
(0.000)
No
62,351
0.093

Repurchaser
1972-2006
(4)
28.292***
(0.000)
-0.139***
(0.000)
-0.026*
(0.099)
-0.085
(0.365)
0.808***
(0.000)
-0.633***
(0.004)
3.273***
(0.000)
-0.845***
(0.000)
-0.034***
(0.005)
-0.068***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.000)
-6.906***
(0.000)
1.384
(0.551)
-0.806***
(0.000)
0.642***
(0.000)
-1.371***
(0.000)
No
80,683
0.082

Repurchaser
1972-2010
(5)
6.344***
(0.000)
-0.116***
(0.002)
0.573***
(0.000)
-1.799***
(0.000)
1.457***
(0.000)
-0.083
(0.768)
1.768***
(0.000)
-0.827***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.001)
-0.032***
(0.008)
0.001
(0.355)
-2.514***
(0.003)
8.177***
(0.000)
-0.072
(0.537)
0.218***
(0.002)
Yes
54,678
0.056

Table 3: Propensity to repurchase
This table shows results for the second of a two-stage regression of repurchasing activity on firm
characteristics and the premiums. The sample period is from 1972 to 2010. The first stage is a set of FamaMacBeth logit regressions modeling the decision to repurchase shares using firm characteristics as controls,
per the following equation:

where NYP is the NYSE market capitalization percentile. M/B is measured as in Fama and French (2001).
Growth in book assets (dA/A) is calculated as the change in asset size between year t-1 and t, scaled by
assets. Profitability (E/A) is the earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data IB) plus interest
expenses (XINT) plus income statement deferred taxes (TXDI) divided by book assets. Yearly values of
coefficients and the explanatory variables are used to predict the probability of repurchasing shares. The
error term u is the prediction error (actual policy minus predicted policy) or the residual propensity to
repurchase shares for a given firm in the year. The residual uit are summed by year, and then divided by the
number of firms in the sample for that year t to get the average annual prediction errors or the “propensity
to repurchase.”
In the second stage, the average annual “propensity to repurchase” (PTR) is regressed on the relevant
premium:
; where
Pt-1 represents the one-year lagged value of the premium variable listed in the (second-stage) result.
Running the first-stage regression with “Fama-French” controls implies running the first-stage FamaMacBeth regressions using the four variables shown above, (i.e., NYP, M/B, dA/A, and E/A) as controls.
Running the first-stage regression with “Fama-French + Risk” controls implies running the first-stage
Fama-MacBeth regressions using Idiosyncratic Risk, Systematic Risk, and the four variables (i.e.,
Systematic Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk, NYP, M/B, dA/A and E/A) as controls. Systematic Risk and
Idiosyncratic Risk are as described in Table 2. Dividend Premium and Difference Premium variables are as
described in Table 1.
Panel A shows results when the first-stage regression is run using all sample firms between 1972 and 2010.
Panel B shows the results when the sample is restricted to the dividend-paying firms in the same time
period. For this, the first-stage regression is run for the choice to repurchase shares (but now only for
dividend-paying firms). The second stage remains the same. Reported p-values are based on robust
standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Panel A. All firms in sample
First stage independent variables:

Fama-French

Second stage dependent variable:
(1)
Difference Premiumt-1

0.111**
(0.040)

Dividend Premiumt-1

Observations
R-Squared
Panel B. Dividend-paying firms
First stage independent variables:

(2)

-0.152*
(0.071)
38
0.112

38
0.088

Fama-French

(1)

(2)

0.186**
(0.019)

Dividend Premiumt-1

Observations
R-Squared

PTR
(3)

-0.150
(0.185)
38
0.103

38
0.080

Fama-French + Risk
PTR
(3)

(4)

0.179**
(0.024)
-0.188
(0.131)

38
0.144

(4)

0.110**
(0.049)

Second stage dependent variable:

Difference Premiumt-1

Fama-French + Risk

38
0.062
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-0.182
(0.146)
38
0.133

38
0.058

Table 4: Lintner model residual dividend error
This table shows results of regressions explaining deviation from predicted dividend payment behavior.
The dependent variable is the residual dividend error (Error), calculated following the Lintner (1956)
model. Error is given by

.
For a firm i in year t, DIV is the dividend (Compustat data DVC), ΔDIV is the actual change in dividends in
year t, EARN is the earnings before extraordinary items (IB), and MV is the market value of equity
(calculated as PRCC_C times CSHO). β1,i, β2,i , and β3,i are the model parameters estimated for each firm i
over the period 1971–1990. These parameters are used to find the predicted change in dividends and then
compared to the actual change to get the Error, using the equation above, for the period 1991–2010. To be
included in the sample, firms must have paid dividends in at least 20 years and repurchased shares in 20
years (not necessarily both in the same year) over the period 1971–2010. Non-operating Income is the nonoperating income before depreciation (NOPI) scaled by total assets. LnMVE is the natural logarithm of the
MV. Difference Premium, Repurchase Yield, Debt, ROA, NYP, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Systematic Risk are
as described in Tables 1 and 2. Std. dev ROA is the standard deviation of ROA, calculated using the last
three years. All independent variables are calculated at end of fiscal year t-1. All specifications use dummy
variables to control for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. Reported p-values are based on robust
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.

Dependent Variable:
Repurchase Yieldt-1
Debtt-1
Non-operating Incomet-1
Std. dev ROAt-1
ROAt-1
LnMVEt-1

(1)
-0.021**
(0.038)
-0.002**
(0.027)
0.006
(0.252)
-0.005
(0.570)
-0.002
(0.337)
0.000***
(0.002)

NYPt-1
Idiosyncratic Riskt-1
Systematic Riskt-1

Error
(2)
-0.019*
(0.052)
-0.002*
(0.083)
0.002
(0.748)
0.001
(0.911)
-0.002
(0.185)
0.000
(0.321)
0.000
(0.757)
-0.103*
(0.085)
-0.005
(0.906)

Difference Premiumt-1
Constant
Observations
Adj R-Squared

-0.001*
(0.052)
3,585
0.009

0.001
(0.475)
3,561
0.019

(3)
-0.021**
(0.033)
-0.002*
(0.077)
0.001
(0.807)
0.001
(0.929)
-0.002
(0.165)
0.000
(0.165)
0.000
(0.976)
-0.104*
(0.080)
-0.015
(0.689)
-0.003*
(0.086)
0.002
(0.331)
3,561
0.020

45

Table 5: Changes in total payout and repurchases
This table shows the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and tobit regressions explaining the fraction of
the additional total payout of firms that is used for repurchasing shares. The dependent variable is the
change in the dollar amount of repurchases divided by the change in total payout, between year t-1 and year
t. Total payout is defined as the sum of share repurchases and dividends. Specifications 1 and 2 show
results for the OLS regressions using data from 1972–2010 and from 1983–2010, respectively.
Specification 3 shows results for a tobit regression using data from 1972–2010. ΔROA is the one-year
change in ROA. All other variables are as described in Tables 1 and 2. All specifications use dummy
variables to control for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. Reported p-values are based on robust
standard errors (also clustered by firm for specifications 1 and 2). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable:

Taxt-1
LnAssetst-1
Debt t-1
Casht-1
FCFt-1
ROAt-1
Std. dev FCFt-1
Returnt-1
M/Bt-1
NYPt-1
Idiosyncratic Riskt-1
Systematic Riskt-1
ΔROA
Difference Premiumt-1
Constant
Observations
Adj R-Squared

ΔRepurchase/(Δ Total Payout)
OLS
1972-2010
(1)
-0.617***
(0.000)
0.032***
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.422)
0.120***
(0.000)
0.942***
(0.000)
-0.749***
(0.000)
0.696***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.804)
0.022***
(0.000)
-0.004***
(0.000)
2.543***
(0.000)
5.507***
(0.000)
-0.020
(0.504)
0.192***
(0.000)
0.477***
(0.000)
59,913
0.084

OLS
1983-2010
(2)
-0.112**
(0.017)
0.007
(0.261)
-0.016
(0.630)
0.074**
(0.012)
0.843***
(0.000)
-0.663***
(0.000)
0.590***
(0.000)
0.002
(0.367)
0.010***
(0.005)
-0.003***
(0.000)
1.810***
(0.000)
6.545***
(0.000)
-0.052*
(0.074)
0.199***
(0.000)
0.574***
(0.000)
42,144
0.060
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Tobit
1972-2010
(3)
-0.592***
(0.000)
0.033***
(0.000)
-0.021
(0.308)
0.080***
(0.000)
0.661***
(0.000)
-0.523***
(0.000)
0.410***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.810)
0.017***
(0.000)
-0.003***
(0.000)
1.524***
(0.000)
4.721***
(0.000)
-0.043
(0.134)
0.184***
(0.000)
0.734***
(0.000)
59,913
0.048

Table 6: Market Reaction to dividend changes
This table shows the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for announcements of a change in the
level of regular quarterly cash dividend paid by firms under certain situations. CARs are calculated using a
market model return in which parameters are estimated using a 255-trading-day window, ending 46 days
prior to the change in dividend announcement and requiring at least 100 observations. Center for Research
in Securities Prices (CRSP) value-weighted portfolio is used as the benchmark for market returns.
Difference Premium is as described in Table 1. Announcements of changes in the regular cash dividend to
be paid to common shareholders are obtained from the CRSP database for the period of 1972–2010.
Changes in dividend announcements are put into two groups. First group includes those where the
announcement leads to an increase in dividends (between 5 and 25% of the last dividend) when the
difference premium decreased. These are in the left panel. The second group includes the announcements
leading to reductions in dividends (between 5 and 25% of the last dividend) when the difference premium
increased. These are in the right panel. These groups are created to see how the market reaction lines up
with the action suggested by the catering hypothesis. The Repurchaser column refers to firms within a
group that have repurchased shares worth more than 1% of the market value of equity within one fiscal
year prior to the announcement of the dividend change. Non-repurchaser refers to firms that do not meet
the repurchaser criterion. Difference shows the difference in CARs between the Repurchaser and the Nonrepurchaser category within the group. Means and medians of the CAR are shown. Significance levels of
means (medians) are tested to see if they are significantly different from zero using a two-tailed t-test
(Wilcoxon Rank-sum test). Then the difference between the means (medians) is tested using a two-tailed ttest (Wilcoxon Rank-sum test). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.

Dividend increase anouncements
when Difference Premium decreased

Mean
Median
Observations

Dividend decrease announcements
when Difference Premium increased

Repurchaser
0.893***

Non-repurchaser
1.052***

Difference
-0.159*

Repurchaser
-0.103

Non-repurchaser
-0.705***

Difference
0.602**

0.723***

0.796***

-0.074*

0.238*

-0.214***

0.452**

2,326

5,287

557

1,463

47

Table 7: Multivariate tests on market response to dividend changes
This table shows results of regressions explaining the market reaction to announcements of dividend
changes. Announcements of changes in the regular cash dividend to be paid to common shareholders are
obtained from the CRSP database for the period 1972–2010. The dependent variable is CAR, as described
in Table 6. The first three specifications include announcements that led to a decrease in the regular cash
dividend to be paid to common shareholders. Specifications 4–6 include announcements that led to an
increase in the cash dividend amount to be paid to common shareholders. To be included in the sample, the
dividend changes have to be between 5 and 25%, relative to the previous dividend. Change Percent is the
absolute value of the percentage change in the dividend. All other variables are as described in Tables 1, 2,
4, and 5. Following Grullon and Michaely (2002), ROA has been truncated at the first and the 99th
percentiles, and Dividend Yield has been truncated at the 99th percentile. Reported p-values are based on
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable:

Repurchasert-1
Change Percent
LnAssetst-1
Dividend Yieldt-1
ΔROA
NYPt-1
Idiosyncratic Riskt-1
Systematic Riskt-1
Difference Premiumt-1
Constant
Observations
Adj R-Squared

CAR
Dividend decrease
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.007**
0.005
0.004
(0.034)
(0.146)
(0.194)
0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.002*
-0.002
-0.003*
(0.081)
(0.141)
(0.074)
0.000
-0.001
-0.001
(0.921)
(0.735)
(0.881)
0.044**
0.033
0.030
(0.037)
(0.139)
(0.182)
0.000*** 0.000***
(0.002)
(0.001)
-0.183
-0.159
(0.612)
(0.643)
-0.228
-0.286
(0.506)
(0.362)
0.052**
(0.022)
0.006
0.018
0.010
(0.479)
(0.105)
(0.364)
1,947
1,947
1,947
0.026
0.040
0.053

48

Dividend increase
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.001*
-0.000
0.001
(0.084)
(0.794)
(0.706)
0.036*
0.037**
0.039**
(0.051)
(0.039)
(0.034)
-0.003*** -0.002***
-0.001
(0.000)
(0.007)
(0.178)
0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.003
-0.003
-0.005
(0.414)
(0.462)
(0.236)
-0.000** -0.000***
(0.013)
(0.002)
-0.009
-0.014
(0.940)
(0.913)
0.117
0.054
(0.443)
(0.730)
-0.011**
(0.012)
0.020*** 0.018***
0.014**
(0.000)
(0.004)
(0.011)
5,816
5,816
5,816
0.015
0.016
0.019

